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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LOUISE LOPEZ DELGADO, 
Defendant/Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code § 78-2a-3(2)(d), and §78-36-11. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly dismiss plaintiff's complaint 
for eviction after finding that Appellee Lopez ("Lopez") was 
substantially in compliance with her lease agreement? 
Whether the evidence presented amounted to compliance with the 
agreement is a question of applying the facts to the agreement and 
the law and as such, the decision of the trial court should be 
given deference by this court. State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
* 
* CASE NO. 950300 - CA 
* PRIORITY NO. 15 
* 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are controlling in this matter: 
Utah Code §78-36-1 et seq. 
Utah Code §78-36-3(1)(c) 
42 USC §1437d(l)(4) 
24 CFR §966.4(1)(3)(i)(A) 
24 CFR §966.4(1)(3)(iii) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Housing Authority of Salt Lake City ("Housing") brought this 
action under Utah Code §78-36-1 et seq., the Utah unlawful detainer 
statute, in an attempt to evict Lopez. [R. 1-3# 31-33] Housing 
posted a bond pursuant to Utah Code §78-36-8.5. [R. 20-21, 27-30, 
34-38] Lopez requested a hearing which was held on April 14, 1995 
before the Honorable Stephen Henriod. [R. 39] Brief testimony was 
taken, argument presented and the case was dismissed by the court 
by order of April 26, 1995. [R. 40] Housing has appealed from 
that Order. [R. 43-44] 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Lopez and Housing entered into a residential lease on or about 
September 1, 1992, which was renewed on a yearly basis, most 
recently on September 1, 1994. [R. 4-13] 
2. This tenancy is governed by the federal public housing 
statutes and regulations, 42 USC §1437 and 24 CFR §966 et seq. 
[R. 57] 
3. Lopez and Housing entered into an agreement in December of 
1994 to settle a debt for unpaid rent, maintenance charges and 
damages to the premises caused by one of Lopez' children. Lopez 
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agreed to pay $20.96 each month for twelve months in addition to 
her rental amount of / ] 
4. Housing has required all tenants to make their rental payments 
into * ocked box in the Housing office. Tenants are unable to 
recei immedic receipt 
5. On February I, 1995 Lopez purchased h.,^; order ~ ^ e 
amount of $57.00 from Smith's Food King. [Ex 
6. Thai, bei! i 11.in i1, Lopez and her . * • m o n e y 
o r d e r in the locked b o x at the housing authority •'<->;* 
7. Housing claimed to have not received Lopez' money order. [R. 
,1] 
8. On February ^A 1995, Housing served Lopez with a ]4-day 
notice to pay rent -r vacate demanding payment r vent owing, late 
ch . . 1 1 .: -. : ,*• - ] 
9. Housing demanded by letter [Ex. 7, R. 65, 80, 83-84] that 
Lopez trace the money order and indicated that the housing 
authori ty woi m II I i I : • t: commence lega 
completed. [R.65] 
Lopez put a tracer on the money order. [R. 84] 
II Tl le trace :: £ the moi i€ 3 :: i: ier showed I lhit it In 
cashed or recovered. Lopez was willing to pay this money to 
Housing. [R. 80-81] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGDMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that Lopez paid a 1 1 but $-96 
of her rent, that she was substantially in compliance with her 
lease and was therefore not subject to eviction for nonpayment. The 
court's decision to dismiss the eviction action should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECISION IN THIS CASE MAY BE UPHELD ON ANY PROPER GROUND 
This appeal stems from an order entered at a hearing held at 
Lopez' request after she was served with a possession bond pursuant 
to Utah Code §78-36-8.5. [R* 40-41, 49-90] A brief hearing was 
held, which included the testimony of two witnesses and argument 
from counsel. [R. 40, 49-90] The court then dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint, acting pursuant to Utah Code § 78-36-8.5 (4), finding 
that all issues between the parties could be adjudicated without 
further court proceedings. The court entered a brief order 
dismissing the complaint on April 26, 1995. [R. 40-41] While more 
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law would be useful to 
this court, the decision of the trial court is amply supported by 
a variety of grounds, any one of which may be the basis for 
upholding the trial court's decision. Since this court can affiinti 
on any reasonable basis, Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah 
App. 1992), the lower court's decision should be affirmed. 
In State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115, (Utah App. 1994), this 
court quoted State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) in 
holding that "[t]rial courts are generally afforded some degree of 
discretion in applying a legal standard to a given set of facts" 
and "[s]uch discretion allows the trial court to reach one of 
several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular 
set of facts without risking reversal." 
This Court should affirm here either on the ground articulated 
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by tl le trial court, substantial compliance with the lease, or on 
the other grounds addressed in this brief, namely iipLlcii ice by 
the plaintiff with federal regulations and state law concerning 
notice, other ground. See Embassy Group v. Hatch, 865 
P.2d 1366, ) . 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT LOPEZ WAS 
SUBSTANTIALLY IN COMPLIANCE WITH HER LEASE 
AGREEMENT 
POINT A 
THE COURT PROPERLY AVOIDED DECREEING FORFEITURE 
OF THE LEASE 
The cour 1: a v oi de< I decreeing forfeitu i: e • :>f Lopez 's subsi d I zed 
lease by finding that Lopez was in substantial compliance with the 
lease agreement. 
In U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Company
 <r 4 J ] I 2ci 86 3 , 869 
(Utah 1970), a case where the appellant argued that the court had 
erred in not voiding the lease for lessee's non-payment of taxes, 
the Supreme C :>i :n :i : t: roi ic] uded that "in equi t] ; [Toll edo] :i s rel ieved 
from any departure here, on the grounds that the defection was so 
minor as to invoke the offices of equity, and that at law substan-
tial compliance with the contract, under t. I'M:* din unistances,, wnuld 
purge an erstwhile default under a general accepted policy against 
forfeiture. . , . •• (Emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court relied on the equitable grounds nf substan-
tial compliance, and general policy grounds against the forfeiture 
of a lease, in upholding the lease in U-Beva, and the trial court 
used reasonin ismissi 
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A policy against forfeiture is well established in Utah 
contract law. In 1946 the Utah Supreme Court stated that "For-
feitures are not favored, and in interpreting an agreement, every 
reasonable presumption should be indulged against an intention to 
allow a forfeiture." Green v. Palfrevman, 166 P.2d 215, 219 (Utah 
1946). Recent Utah Supreme Court cases apply contract law to 
residential leases. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991). 
The policy against forfeiture should be applied to residential 
leases as well. 
Plaintiff is apparently arguing that the court could not, 
under any circumstances, rule that a tenant was substantially in 
compliance with a lease agreement. The trial court disagreed, as 
did the Utah Supreme Court in U-Beva, and as have courts in other 
states, particularly where the eviction action involves tenants 
participating in a federal housing program. 
In Acorn I, Ltd. v. Jones, No. 426956 (Cal. Mun. Ct., Oakland, 
June 25, 1985), 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 660 (No. 39,631, Oct. 1985 
(Attached at Addendum 4-1)) the plaintiff, a federally subsidized 
multifamily housing project, served an eviction notice that 
demanded payment of $2 unpaid rent. The court ruled that a $2 
default in rent did not constitute material noncompliance with the 
rental agreement and that it would be unfair to evict a tenant for 
this amount. 
42 USC §1437d(l)(4) provides that housing agencies must 
utilize leases which require that the agency may not terminate the 
tenancy except for serious or repeated violations of the terms or 
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conditions of the lease u± IUJL :::er good cause. The lease 
between the parties complies with that requirement. 
[R. 8 (Paragraph 16)] The trial court properly found that Lopez 
did not commit serious or repeated violations of the lease, and 
therefore properly refused in iinteif i nc h-ar*^ unnrement between 
the parties. 
This court should follow this authority in holding that the 
trial was 
substantially in compliance with her lease should not be evicted, 
POINT in • •' • -' •
 : 
LOPEZ IS ENTITLED TO SPECIAL PROTECTION AND 
CONSIDERATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN A FEDERALLY 
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING PROGRAM 
Lopez participai 1 t:s i i i a rei i t:a 1 agreemen t that 
is federally subsidized, governed by federal regulations, and 
continuing indefinitely until terminated for good cause. The U.S. 
Supreme tenanl in '.in In .i | mr uyriiui liah a 
property interest protected by the U.S. Constitution and has 
recognized that such a tenant is entitled to remain in that program 
for lif- 'ntil qnnrl canso for evictiv . . See Swann v. 
Gastonia Housing Authority , 502 F.Supp. 362, 365 (1980), citing 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The tenancy is thus 
substantially more significant than the usual term fDI: years 
Utah. 
This situation led the Court of Appeals of Ohio to rule that 
equitable interests must be weighed in < : onsi derati oi i nf subs i d i ZCHI 
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housing terminations. The court stated "[g]enerally, courts, in 
balancing equities, will relieve a tenant from the harsh consequen-
ces of a forfeiture where the payment of money damages will 
adequately compensate the landlord. . . . In the case before us, 
"[the tenant] has a substantial equitable interest in maintaining 
her fully subsidized housing. . ." Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. 
Wooten, 597 N.E.2d 554, 561 (Ohio App.1992). 
This significant difference between a standard rental 
involving two private individuals and one between an individual and 
an agency of the federal government should be considered an 
important factor in this case. The equities, including the 
probable difficulty in finding other subsidized housing, a factor 
relied upon by the Gorsuch court, should here assist Lopez. The 
trial court's refusal to terminate her tenancy and her subsidy and 
forfeit her lease should be upheld. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE FACTS 
PRESENTED AMOUNT TO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
Whether the facts presented at trial showed that Lopez was 
substantially in compliance with her lease is a factual question 
and so the decision of the trial court should be given deference 
unless shown to be clearly in error. State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 
112, 115, (Utah App. 1994) 
Lopez placed a money order in the amount of $57.00 in the 
locked box at Housing's property on February 4, 1995, that is 6 
days before the 14 day notice to pay or vacate was served. [R. 79-
8 
80] The housing authority could not find the money order and wrote 
Lopez a letter on February 17, 1995, asking her to trace it. [R. 
65, 80, 83] As per the letter, the 14-day notice would stay 
effective until the Housing Authority received proof of the trace 
[R. 64], and the Housing Authority would hold off any legal action 
until then. [R. 65] Lopez' trace of the money order revealed that 
the money order had not been cashed or recovered. [R. 80-81] 
While defendant's payment of $57.00 was $.96 short and she 
took two weeks to trace the money order, the trial court ruled that 
Lopez was "substantially in compliance" with the terms and 
conditions of the lease agreement, and while "it would have been 
nice if she had done things a little more quickly", she prevailed. 
[R. 40-41, 88] 
Appellant now states that "While at first blush, 96 cents does 
not appear to be a significant sum, the circumstances of this 
tenant and this landlord must be considered. One dollar is a 
significant part of this tenant's part of the rent . . . " [Brief 
of Appellants at 15] 
To be more precise, appellant is claiming that the amount 
unpaid, 1/58 or .01724 of the total payment due should be 
considered a "significant" enough portion of Lopez' respon-
sibilities under the lease agreement to warrant her eviction and 
the forfeiture of the lease. The trial court could and did find 
that all but 1/58th of the total payment was made, no other 
significant breaches of the lease were raised, and it would be 
unjust and inequitable for an eviction to proceed based on this 
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minimal amount. This discretionary ruling by the trial court 
should be upheld on appeal. 
IV. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY IMPROPERLY 
DEMANDED PAYMENT OF OTHER CHARGES 
IN THE PAY-RENT-OR-QUIT NOTICE 
As previously stated, this court should uphold the decision of 
the trial court on any proper basis presented on appeal. Kenyon v. 
Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah App. 1992). One such basis would be 
that Housing failed to serve a proper notice in this action. 
Housing served Lopez an eviction notice demanding payment of rent 
owing, late charges and the entire balance owing on the repayment 
agreement. [R. 14-17] This notice intended to be a combination of 
the 14 day notice required by federal regulation 24 CFR 
§966.4(1) (3) (i) (A) and a notice under Utah law, Utah Code §78-36-
3(1)(c). A combination of state and federal notices is allowed by 
24 CFR §966.4(1)(3)(iii). However, the notice was an incorrect 
combination: it required payment of the balance of the repayment 
agreement within 14 days. The 14 day notice can only be used for 
nonpayment of rent. 24 CFR §966 .4(1) (3) (i) The inclusion of other 
charges allegedly owed rendered the notice improper under the 
federal regulations and the lease agreement. A 30 day notice 
should have been served to demand payment of the other charges in 
order to comply with 24 CFR §966.4(1) (3) (i) (C) and paragraph 16 of 
the lease agreement. [R. 8] 
In St. Clair County Hous. Auth. V. Turner, No. 89-LM-451 (111. 
Cir. Ct., St. Clair County, May 19, 1989), 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
618 (No. 44,680, Aug./Sept 1989), the Housing Authority served a 14 
10 
day notice demanding both rent and other charges owed. The court 
granted Turner's motion to dismiss because the notice was fatally 
defective. It should not have included other charges in the demand 
for rent. 
Utah law also requires strict compliance with the notice 
requirements in the unlawful detainer statute. Failure to follow 
state law notice requirements resulted in dismissal of the 
eviction action in Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979). 
While federal regulations govern this tenancy, those regulations 
incorporate state law procedures for termination of a tenancy. Our 
state law requires strict compliance. Housing served a notice 
demanding more money than was due, and demanded that the extra 
amount be paid within a shorter time period than allowed by federal 
regulation. 
Housing has not strictly complied with applicable law, here 
the federal regulations. This improper notice should be considered 
another basis for the court's ruling dismissing the eviction 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should uphold the decision of the trial court 
dismissing the eviction action against Lopez. 
K&y r ' i 
Respectfully submitted this yJ day of ^^ M :<,iuY^  , 1995. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
^ \ — — -
BY? l^EBrlCMITTELSTADT 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: L. Zane Gill, LAW OFFICE OF 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C., Attorneys for Appellants, 215 South State 
Street, Suite 545, Salt Lake City,Utah 84111 on this | ^  day of 
^^StcTi/t1 tei , 1995, postage prepaid, 
^ 
i— f 
[common\housing\appeals\lopez5.brf] 
12 
78-36-2. "Forcible de ta ine r" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who 
either: 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of vio-
lence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession 
of any real property, whether the same was ac-
quired peaceably or otherwise; or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of 
the occupants of any real property, unlawfully 
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the 
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three 
days to surrender the same to such former occu-
pant. The occupant of real property within the 
meaning of this subdivision is one who within 
five days preceding such unlawful entry was in 
the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such 
lands. 1953 
C H A P T E R 36 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
Section 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" defined. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term 
less than life. 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands 
to hold over. 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against 
undertenant. 
78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served. 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — 
Time for appearance — Service of 
summons. 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alter-
native remedies. 
78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff— Defense. 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, 
and rent — Immediate enforcement 
— Treble damages. 
78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — En-
forcement — Disposition of personal 
property — Hearing. 
Time for appeal. 
Exclusion of tenant without judicial 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excepted. 
Definitions. 
Abandoned premises — Retaking and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of 
tenant — Personal property of ten-
ant left on premises. 
78-36-1. "Forc ib le e n t r y " defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who ei-
ther: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other 
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or 
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circum-
stances of terror, enters upon or into any real 
property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real prop-
erty, turns out by force, threats or menacme con-
78-36-11. 
78-36-12. 
78-36-12.3. 
78-36-12.6. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term 
less than life. 
( D A tenant of real property, for a term less than 
life, is guilty of an unlawful deta iner 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, 
after the expiration of the specified term or pe-
riod for which it is let to him, which specified 
term or period, whether established by express or 
implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expira-
tion of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an 
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic 
rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in per-
son or by subtenant after the end of any 
month or period, in cases where the owner, 
his designated agent, or any successor in es-
tate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to 
the end of that month or period, has served 
notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after 
the expiration of a notice of not less than five 
days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of 
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the 
surrender of the detained premises, has re-
mained uncomplied with for a period of three 
days after service, which notice may be served at 
any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased 
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, 
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful busi-
ness on or in the premises, or when he suffers, 
permits, or maintains on or about the premises 
any nuisance, including nuisance as defined in 
Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; 
or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to per-
form any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, 
other than those previously mentioned, and after 
notice in writing requinng in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the 
surrender of the propertv. served upon him and 
78-36-4 JUDICIAL CODE 350 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days 
after service. Within three days after the service 
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the 
term, or other person interested in its contin-
uance may perform the condition or covenant and 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except 
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per-
formed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a 
mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 
16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsec-
tion 78-36-3(1 )(d) are not applicable to nuisance ac-
tions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 
only. 1992 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to 
hold over. 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, 
where the tenant has held over and retained posses-
sion for more than 60 days after the expiration of his 
term without any demand of possession or notice to 
quit by the owner, his designated agent, or his succes-
sor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by permis-
sion of the owner, his designated agent, or his succes-
sor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the 
terms of the lease for another full year, and shall not 
be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; 
and the holding over for the 60-day period shall be 
taken and construed as a consent on the part of the 
tenant to hold for another year. 1981 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against 
undertenant. 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those 
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the 
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 1953 
78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served. 
The notices required by the preceding sections may 
be served: 
(1) bv delivering a copy to the tenant person-
ally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or 
certified mail addressed to the tenant at his place 
of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or 
from his usual place of business, by leaving a 
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion 
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant 
at the address of his place of residence or place of 
business; 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion can-
not be found at the place of residence, then by 
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the 
leased property; or 
(5) if an order of abatement by eviction of the 
nuisance is issued by the court as provided in 
Section 78-38-11, when issued, the parties 
present shall be on notice that the abatement by 
eviction order is issued and immediately effective 
or as to any absent party, notice shall be given as 
provided in Subsections (1) through (4). 
(6) Service upon a subtenant may be made in 
the same manner. 1992 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the prem-
ises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual occu-
pation of the premises when the action is commenced, 
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, 
except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any 
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for 
the nonjoinder of any person who might have been 
made a party defendant; but when it appears that any 
of the parties served with process or appearing in the 
proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered 
against those parties. 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the prem-
ises in controversy after the service of any notice as 
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was 
not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the 
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after 
the commencement of the action shall be bound by 
the judgment the same as if they had been made par-
ties to the action. 
13) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a nec-
essary party defendant only in an abatement by evic-
tion action for an unlawful drug house as provided in 
Section 78-38-13. 1992 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — 
Time for appearance — Service of 
summons. 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting 
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set 
forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence 
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible 
entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim 
damages therefor or compensation for the occupation 
of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer 
charged is after default in the payment of rent, the 
complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The 
court shall indorse on the summons the number of 
days within which the defendant is required to ap-
pear and defend the action, which shall not be less 
than three or more than 20 days from the date of 
service. The court may authorize service by publica-
tion or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is 
complete one week after publication. Service by mail 
is complete three days after mailing. The summons 
shall be changed in form to conform to the time of 
service as ordered, and shall be served as in other 
cases. 1987 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alter-
native remedies. 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint 
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may 
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be 
in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified 
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons 
who own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The court shall approve the 
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of 
costs of suit and damages which may result to the 
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. 
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for 
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages 
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a posses-
sion bond. This notice shall be served in the same 
manner as service of summons and shall inform the 
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and pro-
cedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and pro-
cedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a 
possession bond under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer ac-
tion based solely upon nonpayment of rent or 
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in 
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the 
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defendant, within three days of the service of the 
notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, 
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, in-
cluding attorney's fees, as provided in the rental 
agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if 
he executes and files a counter bond in the form 
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified^ funds, 
or a property bond executed by two persons who 
own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at 
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable 
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file 
the bond prior to the expiration of three days 
from the date he is served with notice of the fil-
ing of plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall 
approve the bond in an amount that is the proba-
ble amount of costs of suit and actual damages 
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant 
has improperly withheld possession. The court 
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a por-
tion of the defendant's total bond. 
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be 
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expira-
tion of three days from the date the defendant is 
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs pos-
session bond. 
13) If the defendant does not elect and comply with 
a remedy under Subsection l2) within the required 
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be 
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the 
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the prop-
erty is situated shall return possession of the prop-
erty to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Sub-
section (2)(c), and if the court rules after the hearing 
that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the prop-
erty, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return 
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the 
hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in 
possession and further issues remain to be adjudi-
cated between the parties, the court shall require the 
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection 
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues 
between the parties can be adjudicated without fur-
ther court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudi-
cating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
1987 
78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense. 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry 
or forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be re-
quired to show, in addition to the forcible entry or 
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peace-
ably in the actual possession at the time of the forc-
ible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the 
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may 
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those 
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been 
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one 
whole year continuously next before the commence-
ment of the proceedings, and that his interest therein 
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is 
a bar to the proceedings. 1953 
78-36-10. J u d g m e n t for rest i tut ion, damages, 
and rent — Immedia te enforcement — 
Treble damages . 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or 
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of 
the premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If the 
nrnroorlmo- ic for nnlnvvful Hptqippr ^ftPT nPSflect Or 
failure to perform any condition or covenant of the 
lease or agreement under which the property is held, 
or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment 
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agree-
ment. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defen-
dant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the com-
plaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged un-
lawful detainer is after default in the payment of 
rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction 
as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3> The judgment shall be entered against the de-
fendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through 
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon 
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may 
be issued and enforced immediately. 1994 
78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — En-
forcement — Disposition of personal 
property — Hearing. 
(1) Each order of restitution shall: 
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the prem-
ises, remove his personal property, and restore 
possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be 
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable; 
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set 
by the court for the defendant to vacate the prem-
ises, which shall be three business days following 
service of the order, unless the court determines 
that a longer or shorter period is appropriate un-
der the circumstances; and 
(c) advise the defendant of his right to a hear-
ing to contest the terms of the order of restitution 
or the manner of its enforcement. 
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form 
for the defendant to request a hearing shall be 
served personally upon the defendant in accor-
dance with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. If personal service is impossible or imprac-
ticable, service may be made by mailing a copy of 
the order and the form to the defendant's last-
known address and posting a copy of the order 
and the form at a conspicuous place on the prem-
ises. 
(b) The date of service, the name, title, signa-
ture, and telephone number of the person serving 
the order and the form shall be legibly endorsed 
on the copy of the order and the form served on 
the defendant. 
(c) Within ten days of service, the person serv-
ing the order and the form shall file proof of ser-
vice in accordance with Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the 
order within the time prescribed by the court, a 
sheriff or constable at the plaintiffs direction 
may enter the premises by force using the least 
destructive means possible to remove the defen-
d a n t
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(b) Any personal property of the defendant 
may be removed from the premises by the sheriff 
or constable and transported to a suitable loca-
tion for safe storage. The sheriff or constable, 
with the plaintiffs consent, may delegate respon-
sibility for storage to the plaintiff, who must 
store the personal property in a suitable place 
and in a reasonable manner. 
(c) The personal property removed and stored 
shall be inventoried by the sheriff or constable 
who shall keep the original inventory and per-
sonally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of 
the inventory immediately after the personal 
property is removed. 
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant 
within 30 days of removal of personal property 
from the premises, the sheriff or constable shall 
promptly return all of the defendant's personal 
property upon payment of the reasonable costs 
incurred for its removal and storage. 
(b) The person storing the personal property 
may sell the property remaining in storage at a 
public sale if: 
(i) the defendant does not request a hear-
ing or demand return of the personal prop-
erty within 30 days of its removal from the 
premises; or 
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reason-
able costs incurred for the removal and stor-
age of the personal property. 
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing 
the personal property shall mail to the defen-
dant's last-known address a written notice of the 
time and place of the sale. 
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he 
may specify the order in which the personal prop-
erty shall be sold, and only so much personal 
property shall be sold as to satisfy the costs of 
removal, storage, advertising, and conducting 
the sale. The remainder of the personal property, 
if any, shall be released to the defendant. If the 
defendant is not present at the sale, the proceeds, 
after deduction of the costs of removal, storage, 
advertising, and conducting the sale shall be paid 
to the plaintiff up to the amount of any judgment 
the plaintiff obtained against the defendant. Any 
surplus shall be paid to the defendant, if the de-
fendant's whereabouts are known. If the defen-
dant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus 
shall be disposed of in accordance with Title 78, 
Chapter 44, Uniform Unclaimed Property Act. 
(e) If the property belonging to a person who is 
not a defendant is removed and stored in accor-
dance with this section, that person may claim 
the property by delivering a written demand for 
its release to the sheriff or constable. If the claim-
ant provides proper identification and evidence of 
ownership, the sheriff or constable shall 
promptly release the property at no cost to the 
claimant, 
(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the terms 
of the order of restitution or the manner of its en-
forcement, the defendant or any person claiming to 
own stored personal property may file a request for a 
hearing. The court shall set the matter for hearing 
within ten days from the filing of the request, or as 
soon thereafter as practicable, and shall mail notice 
of the hearing to the parties. 
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms nec-
essary to implement this section. 1994 
78-36-11. Time for appea l . 
Q) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either 
party may, within ten days, appeal from the judg-
ment rendered. 
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9 
through 78-38-16, any party may appeal from the 
judgment rendered within three days. 1992 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a 
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner ex-
cept by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the con-
tents of the leased premises under Subsection 
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempt-
ing to rent them at a fair rental value when the ten-
ant has abandoned the premises. 1981 
78-36-12.3. Definitions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the ten-
ant from entering into the premises with intent to 
deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the prem-
ises and shall also have the same meaning as land-
lord under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the fol-
lowing situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence 
other than the presence of the tenant's personal 
property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed 
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable 
evidence that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises. 1981 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking 
and rerenting by owner — Liability of 
tenant — Personal property of tenant 
left on premises. 
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may 
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a 
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of 
the term; or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period neces-
sary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental 
value, plus the difference between the fair rental 
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental 
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the 
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, nec-
essary to restore the rental unit to its condition 
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and 
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec-
tion (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not 
re-rent the premises. 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and 
has left personal property on the premises, the owner 
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, 
store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and 
storage costs from the tenant. The owner shall make 
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location 
of the personal property; however, if the property has 
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has 
made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner 
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward 
any amount the tenant owes. Any money left over 
from the sale of the property shall be handled as spec- ADDIl^DlM 1—<-
ified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this 
42 USC ()1437d(l ) 
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(/) Leases; terms and conditions; maintenance; termination 
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which— 
(1) do not contain unreasonable terms and conditions; 
(2) obligate the public housing agency to maintain the project 
in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition; 
(3) require the public housing agency to give adequate written 
notice of termination of the lease which shall not be less than— 
(A) a reasonable time, but not to exceed 30 days, when 
the health or safety of other tenants or public housing 
agency employees is threatened; 
(B) 14 days in the case of nonpayment of rent; and 
(C) 30 days in any other case; 
(4) require that the public housing agency may not terminate 
the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of the terms 
or conditions of the lease or for other good cause; 
(5) provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, 
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other 
tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such 
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of 
the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the 
tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy; and 
(6) specify that with respect to any notice of eviction or 
termination, notwithstanding any State law, a public housing 
tenant shall be informed of the opportunity, prior to any hearing 
or trial, to examine any relevant documents, records, or regula-
tions directly related to the eviction or termination. 
For purposes of paragraph (5), the term "drug-related criminal 
activity" means the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, use, or 
possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use, of a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21). 
(1) Termination of tenancy and evic-
tion—(1) Procedures. The lease shall set 
forth the procedures to be followed by 
o/ nm n n ^ / /-i \ t h e P H A ^ b v t h e tenant in termi-
24 CFR ( ) 9 6 6 . 4 ( 1 ) nating the lease. 
(2) Grounds for termination, (i) The 
PHA shall not terminate or refuse to 
renew the lease other than for serious 
or repeated violation of material terms 
of the lease such as failure to make 
payments due under the lease or to ful-
fill the tenant obligations set forth in 
{966.4(f) or for other good cause. 
(ii) Either of the .following types of 
criminal activity by the tenant, any 
member of the household, a guest, or 
another person under the tenant's con-
trol, shall be cause for termination of 
tenancy: 
(A) Any criminal activity that 
threatens the health, safety or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of the PHA's public 
housing premises by other residents. 
(B) Any drug-related criminal activ-
ity on or near such premises. 
(3) Lease termination notice, (i) The 
PHA shall give written notice of lease 
termination of: 
(A) 14 days in the case of failure to 
pay rent; 
(B) A reasonable time considering the 
seriousness of the situation (but not to 
exceed 30 days) when the health or 
safety of other residents or PHA em-
ployees is threatened; and 
(C) 30 days in any other case. 
(ii) The notice of lease termination 
to the tenant shall state specific 
grounds for termination, and shall in-
form the tenant of the tenant's right to 
make such reply as the tenant may 
wish. The notice shall also inform the 
tenant of the right (pursuant to 
§944.4(m)) to examine PHA documents 
directly relevant to the termination or 
eviction. When the PHA is required to 
afford the tenant the opportunity for a 
grievance hearing, the notice shall also 
inform the tenant of the tenant's right 
to request a hearing in accordance with 
the PHA's grievance procedure. 
(iii) A notice to vacate which is re-
quired by State or local law may be 
combined with, or run concurrently 
with, a notice of lease termination 
under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, 
(iv) When the PHA is required to af-
ford the tenant the opportunity for a 
hearing under the PHA grievance pro-
cedure for a grievance concerning the 
lease termination (see § 966.51(a)(1)). 
the tenancy shall not terminate (even 
if any notice to vacate under State or 
local law has expired) until the time 
for the tenant to request a grievance 
hearing has expired, and (if a hearing 
was timely requested by the tenant) 
the grievance process has been com-
pleted, 
(v) When the PHA is not required to 
afford the tenant the opportunity for a 
hearing under the PHA administrative 
grievance procedure for a grievance 
concerning the lease termination (see 
§966.51(aX2)), and the PHA has decided 
to exclude such grievance from the 
PHA grievance procedure, the notice of 
lease termination under paragraph 
(l)(3Xi) of this section shall: 
(A) State that the tenant is not enti-
tled to a grievance hearing on the ter-
mination. ADDENDUM 3-1 
(B) Specify the judicial eviction pro-
cedure to be used by the PHA for evic-
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vs. 
GWENDOLYN JONES, 
Defendant. 
No. 426956 
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WILLIAM H. LIGHTFOOT, 
Attorney at Law. 
CONSTANCE DeLaVEGA, 
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) TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 1985 — 10:20 O'CLOCK A.M. 
2 - — o O o - — 
3 MS. DeLaVEGA: I would just like to make, make an oral 
4 argument if Mr. Lightfoot doesn*t want to go first. I would 
5 like to request a statement of decision under CCP332. 
6 MR. LIGHTFOOT: I think, your Honor, that isn't 
7 appropriate. I think a trial has to last all day or at least 
g a half a day or something. 
9 THE COURT: No. She can request it. Well, first of all, 
10 I still agree with your position the $2 rent is at the 
JJ minimus amount of money in light of the fact that the rent for 
12 this property is $618 a month, $612 of which has been paid by 
13 the Government, that there ought to be some other procedure 
14 for collecting this small amount of money before resorting to 
15 an eviction proceeding, that under the circumstances of this 
]$ case I think that it would be unfair to evict a tenant for 
17 this small amount of money. 
18 First of all, the landlord had more money than the 
19 landlord was entitled to at one point. He had some of the 
20 tenant's money. I assumed that it was in a bank account 
21 somewhere. It might have even been drawing interest. The 
22 tenant get any credit for that? That — that considering the 
23 total circumstances surrounding the way the rent — the way the 
24 tenant became behind in the rent as well as the amount for 
25 which she was behind that some other procedure other than 
26 eviction should have taken place first to give her an 
27 opportunity to pay the money, and then if she wasn't — did 
28 not make up the rent, then I think it would have been appropric 
LOIS M. LAMBERT. C.S.R. 
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1 to result to the eviction proceedings. And because of that 
2 I'm going to deny your request for eviction. 
3 MR. LIGHTFOOT: Before the Court makes the decision, may 
4 I just respond to that? 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. LIGHTFOOT: Okay. Your Honor, on HUD's subsidized 
7 property there fs a multitude of regulations that has been 
3 laid out to a particular tenant that no conventional tenant 
9 is entitled to. And then I think to superimpose any 
10 additional requirements over and above those, that we can ft 
]
 1 really anticipate the — you know, we can at least anticipate 
j2 all these HUD requirements. And as I said there's a whole 
13 bunch of those they have to be aware of and do everything we 
14 can to be able to interpret correctly and comply with that 
15 are designed for the other tenants. [Sic.J I think then to 
16 go a step beyond that and say we are going to have to meet 
17 some other additional requirement that we couldn't anticipate 
18 having done everything that we need to do as far as both the 
19 State Law is concerned and the Federal Law, I think, would 
20 be asking too much. 
21 THE COURT: Well, what would have been wrong with 
22 sending her a notice in December stating that "You've got a 
23 credit of $5 from past rent that's paid. You owe $2 and you 
24 have ten days to pay it"? 
25 MR. LIGHTFOOT: I think, your Honor — 
26 THE COURT: You know. What would have been wrong with 
27 that? 
28 M R . LIGHTFOOT: I think that would be fine. No 
LOIS M. LAMBERT, C.S.R. 
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1 problem with it. I think itfs not required. What HUD says 
2 is that you have to give them ten day notice in which you state 
3 dn that notice that they have ten days in which to respond/ 
4 which that notice does state, and advise them. And as Miss 
5 Jones testified at the time I served her, I told her, you know, 
6 "Don't worry about it, she's got ten days to come in and pay 
7 it." She asked me something about it. I donft really recall 
8 the conversation, but I know that's what I tell tenants 
9 sometime. 
10 So that she knew she had ten days. She said she thought 
11 she had ten days other than the weekend. But it would be on, 
12 an assumption that is like playing Russian Roulet to make that 
13 assumption instead of going ahead and paying it. And in fact 
)4 she didn't make the payment until after she got the complaint — 
15 summons of complaint. 
16 THE COURT: I understand. 
17 MR. LIGHTFOOT: So the rumor might be that after she got 
18 the summons of complaint she went over and paid the rent. 
19 According to my reasoning, there's no legal basis for a 
20 complaint here. It's like feeling sorry for, for a tenant. 
21 THE COURT: It's not feeling sorry. But that defeats the 
22 whole purpose of the complaint as I understand the program that 
23 tends to subsidise rent for low budgeted people. I don't know 
24 what her income is like but it seems to be a low budget. 
25 There's — it's no problem for the HUD, Acorn Projects 
26
 J sending out a notice before resorting to eviction proceedings. 
I don't see how that can be a hardship to you. 
And I think that it points out, too, by implementing the 
27 
28 
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 eviction procedure without doing that that she later said she 
2 misunderstood what the ten-day notice meant whether it was 
3 working days versus ten days — calendar days. And a lot of 
4 times that's even confused by lawyers as to when you have to 
5 act within ten days whether you mean ten calendar days versus 
6 ten working days. 
7 MR. LIGHTFOOT: But should that be shifted over, the 
8 blame put on us, your Honor, for her misinterpretation? 
9 THE COURT: No. I'm not saying it's who's at fault or — 
10 but I'm just saying eviction proceedings has to be fair to the 
11 tenant and as well as to the landlord. And in this case it's 
12 not fair for you to be evicting a tenant over the payment of 
13 a $2 bill when you implemented the eviction procedure. I 
14 think she has an obligation to pay the rent and it sounds like 
15 she was doing okay. She was paying in advance even, and that 
16 there ought to have been some other way to collect the $2 
17 other than through serving the notice of eviction. 
18 MR. LIGHTFOOT: Your Honor, I think we are going to ask 
19
 I for the Plaintiff's ~ 
THE COURT: Well, I just stated and that's why I'm telling 
you on the record why I'm making the decision so that it will 
serve as the statement of decision. That I'm denying your 
request for restitution of the property — 
MR. LIGHTFOOT: I see. 
THE COURT: Because of the way the background came about 
and also the way that you proceeded to collect it. 
MR. LIGHTFOOT: So it would be basically, your Honor, the 
mini diminimus because of the rent diminimus; is that right? 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1 THE COURT: Well, the way it came about is through her 
2 paying rent in advance as well as the way that you attempted 
3 to collect it by using the eviction process without first 
4 giving her a bill for the additional $2. 
5 MR. LIGHTFOOT: Prior to the ten-day notice? 
6 THE COURT: Prior to the ten-day notice I think is — 
7 the ten-day notice — if you'd sent her a bill first and she 
g didn't pay it the ten-day not be would have brought home to 
9 her that this was serious and that this defect was serious and 
that you intended to evict her, I'm also concerned that 
almost her total rent is being paid by the Government and so I 
don't see where it's a financial hardship to the Plaintiff in 
this case. 
4 I MR. LIGHTFOOT: Any other reason, your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: For all those reasons I'm denying restitution 
16 * o f t h e property. 
17 MR. LIGHTFOOT: Thank you, your Honor, 
18 MS. DeLaVEGA^ Thank youf your Honor. 
19 [Proceedings concluded at 11:00 o'clock a.m.] 
20 I oOo 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
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